

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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21 April 1986

Mr. Leo Cherne
589 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10017

Dear Leo:

I can't tell you how much I appreciated both your note and your going to all the trouble to come to Washington for the swearing in. One of the biggest debts I owe Bill Casey over the last five years has been the opportunity through him to get to know you. Your friendship and respect mean a great deal to me.

Again, I deeply appreciate your coming from New York for the ceremony.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

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LEO CHERNE
589 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

DDI- 01294X/86

March 5, 1986

Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Room 7E44 - Headquarters
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bob:

Though I have already verbally conveyed my extreme pleasure when you told me of your upcoming appointment, I feel compelled to express my feelings more formally.

In the five years since PFIAB was restored to existence, there has not been a single occasion (and happily, there have been a number of them) on which my relationship with you has been other than thoughtful, generous and totally cooperative.

But my feelings are greater than that. I cannot honestly recall a single appointment made by the President within this period of time which more excites my admiration. The only hitch is that you will be leaving two very sizeable responsibilities that are of enormous importance and your shoes will not easily fit someone else, though the wisdom of this move leads me to believe that filling those responsibilities will be done with comparable wisdom and skill.

My one hope is that as Deputy DCI the contact between us does not diminish, and you can be certain that wherever it is I can be helpful, I am eager to be.

I am in the process of going through a 50 year accumulation of papers because the Research Institute will be moving its quarters a month from now. In the course of doing so, I ran across testimony which the Pike Committee requested that three of us give the last

Robert M. Gates
March 5, 1986
Page 3

day of their hearings. Though no member of PFIAB had previously, to my knowledge, testified, I was strongly encouraged to do so. Since the Pike Committee was disbanded by the Congress and no report filed, I don't even know how I got this testimony.

Incidentally, Bill Colby spoke later that day for the community. I think you will find my remarks interesting, whether you altogether agree with my eccentricities or not.

With my congratulations and appreciation.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Leo", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Leo Cherne

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future, and can abide by the rules that we Americans set for that service.

Then, Mr. Chairman, I hope that the CIA can stop being a scapegoat for sensation, created by its own critiques which were done so that it can improve its procedures. I hope by that time, when we get to 1990, we will not look back on 1975 and marvel at the naivete of the Americans of 1975 as we now marvel at the naivete of the Americans of the 1920's. I believe we will have a responsible intelligence service and I believe that all of us Americans will be responsible about it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman PIKE. Thank you, Mr. Colby. No one wants more than I do to proceed immediately with questioning. I will only say that in fairness to our other witnesses and because we have four witnesses scheduled today, and a quorum call going on right now, we will continue with the presentation.

What is your time schedule, Mr. Colby?

Mr. COLBY. I am at your disposal, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman PIKE. Then what we are going to do is hear the statements from all of our witnesses for the 5-minute period this morning and, if necessary, we will hear them in the afternoon.

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STATEMENT OF LEO CHERNE, MEMBER, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN ADVISORY BOARD; EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA

Mr. CHERNE. Thank you.

First of all, let me express my appreciation in turn for the invitation to address this select committee. When I received the request earlier this week, I was told that the representatives of both parties concurred in expressing the hope I might present some overview, some sense of the future needs for intelligence.

I will unavoidably repeat some things you know, but I do hope some of my observations will be helpful to you in your most important undertaking.

First, let me salute this committee for the two main thrusts of its investigation. Under your direction, Mr. Chairman, there has been an effort to determine whether our intelligence has been adequate for the needs and dangers we have faced and whether we have proceeded to obtain the intelligence we require, with sufficient regard for the rights of the individual and the obligations of law under the Constitution.

Now, before I expand on those, with your indulgence, I think you are entitled to something of my background against which to measure some of my observations.

I have been the executive director of the Research Institute of America for nearly 40 years. That activity has sharpened whatever capabilities I have as an economist and political scientist. That time has been spent in good part in the study of governmental institutions gathered in this city. I confess that at a time when it is fashionable to derogate government, I have always had and continue to have a passionate respect for this most difficult, overcriticized, underpaid, and very undervalued activity. I include this body as well as the executive branch in that expression.

Chairman PIKE. Even if it hurts.

Mr. CHERNE. It does not hurt at all, Mr. Chairman.

Twenty-four years ago the distinguished theologian, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, urged me to succeed him as chairman of the International Rescue Committee. I have since then occupied that post. That committee was formed days after Hitler came to power for the purpose of assisting the democratic leaders and scholars of Germany who might have to flee that country. Since then, the IRC has assisted hundreds of thousands of those who have fled Fascist, Communist, and nondescript forms of totalitarianism jeopards. Those helped have fled the Soviet Union and the military government of Greece, Castro's Cuba, and Duvalier's Haiti.

We assist those who have been refugees from the Communist countries of central Europe and those who safely reach Hong Kong. We have resettled more than 100,000 Cubans in this country, and are helping 18,000 of the Vietnamese who are now in our midst.

For more than 20 years I have been chairman of the executive committee of Freedom House, an organization which was founded in 1910 by William Allen White, David Dubinsky, Roy Wilkins, Wendell Willkie, and others to advance the struggle for freedom. The present chairman is former Senator Margaret Chase Smith.

Now, just a couple of final personal notes which I do think are relevant to this committee's purposes. I have had the privilege, in one context or another, to serve each President since 1938. Each of these occasions has involved an opposition to totalitarianism. On one occasion, I was told that I had earned the displeasure of the Director of the FBI. I had made myself a determined nuisance to Senator Joseph McCarthy beginning 1 month after he entered the Senate in 1947, and continued that opposition to the Senator until 1954 when he was censured.

1885

party. The very privacy which has been accorded to JFLAB has, I believe, sheltered it from the temptation to grandstand, politick, or otherwise bend before the political winds.

I was involved in one very reassuring episode in exactly that connection.

I was appointed a member of that Board at a point when the Watergate investigation already made it quite clear that there had been a serious breach of faith. Days before I learned of my appointment, I made an address critical of the Watergate affair and of responses to it which had been coming from the White House.

I thought Admiral Anderson, Chairman of that Board, ought to know of my views, and I quickly sent him a copy of those remarks. I received not the slightest suggestion that I desist from such expressions.

I was invited to testify, in particular to make some comments on our future requirements in the intelligence area. It is with great regret I must start by saying I see nothing in the foreseeable future likely to change the fact that sovereign nations remain virtually unimpeded by law in all of those areas involving national security.

I welcome the fact that efforts toward détente have been made, and I welcome the increasing realization in and out of Government that détente is a process, not a conclusion—a means of limiting the most frightful dangers of belligerency, and not of guaranteeing even that fact.

I believe some portion of the American people may have made assumptions about détente not shared by the architects of that policy. I also believe that, initially at least, the policy was oversold. But I am sure I say nothing you do know vividly when I add that the policy of détente does not effectively limit hostility, or ideological warfare, or local warfare, or organized subversion, or encouragement of terrorists, or many of the other hazards with which we have become all too familiar.

As Mr. Colby just said, and very well we live in a far more interdependent world than was the case even 5 years ago, and things now happen so quickly that the reaction time for those who must make decisions is terribly short. Therefore, effective intelligence analysis and estimates are so much more critical.

Just 2 days ago, may I digress by saying, I saw a new IBM system which has the startling capability of digging into its memories of infinite capability and printing 15,000 lines per minute. That is more than the size of a full book printed by the computer per minute.

Regrettably we are still human with not a much greater capacity to absorb that than we had before the computer was involved.

I repeat, the decision time is terribly short now, and, therefore, effective intelligence analysis and estimates are so much more critical. The shock of the oil embargo made that painfully clear. But our dependency on foreign petroleum is only one of a number of areas in which we are dependent on other nations, and they on us.

The fact of mutual dependency, however, is no assurance that the economic conduct of nations will be benign; that the rivalries will not be painful and dangerous; that food, raw materials, national monetary reserves, and a host of other things will not be made the subject of

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My attention was drawn to the Senator because of my own deep concern with the Communist Party. I found it alarming that the Communist Party, through its instruments in Wisconsin, openly and actively supported McCarthy, if only for the purpose of unseating Senator Robert La Follette, who at that moment had launched an investigation into the extent of Communist domination of U.S. Labor unions.

At a later time, I thought that the frequent social contact between McCarthy and FBI Director Hoover inappropriate. My saying so was not appreciated. In time, my criticisms of Senator McCarthy and of his disregard for personal rights led to a threat being conveyed to me that libel proceedings would be instituted if I did not desist. I said that such an action would serve a purpose I long thought useful—having the Senator in court under oath. The threat subsided.

Gentlemen, I appreciate your indulgence in these personal details. I hope I am sensitive to the committee's concern for the protection of the right of privacy of American citizens, the conduct of intelligence within the law, and, perhaps most important, for the urgency of assuring the American people that intelligence and personnel of the intelligence community must never again be requested or permitted to perform some service useful to anyone's domestic political purposes.

Neither foreign intelligence nor domestic intelligence, neither the CIA nor the FBI, must ever again be requested to perform or acquiesce in an activity which, whatever guise is asserted, actually seeks to serve an individual's ambition or a political candidate's or party's purposes.

It is with a kind of relief that I now know, as a result of these investigations, that the abuse of and by the intelligence community has occurred during the administrations of both parties. This misbehavior has occurred under Presidents who were held in awe, or admired for their grace, or respected for their candor, or revered for the gratitude we have for those who got us out of danger, or were seen as simply sometimes ruthless, beleaguered, or ambitious. Gentlemen, this has not been a problem more characteristic of one party than the other.

These abuses are perhaps inherent in the fact of power. And all too much power, for too long a time, was enjoyed—with no restraint by anyone—by a much praised man who held his police post too long and knew too much about too many people, and appeared not at all reticent to convey that fact. I am relieved by that fact, and let me tell you why.

The bipartisan character of these past difficulties means that we can now proceed to a bipartisan set of corrections and protections which, even in an election year, have a chance of being kept out of partisan politics.

While I am still on the subject of abuses for reasons of personal ambition or political advantage, let me say something about the Board on which I serve, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. I do not appear here as a representative of that Board or, for that matter, as anyone's representative, but simply as your guest at your invitation. I am not free to speak of the deliberations of that Board or the recommendations which have been given to a succession of Presidents, but I know of no restraint which can keep me from telling you that on not one occasion have I observed a single member of the Board bending a judgment or stressing a weight which would advance the political interest of the particular President, his administration, or

1886

dangerous conflict with our adversaries, and even intervals of extreme tension with one or another of our friends.

These pressures which have radically narrowed the world, even as they have enlarged the hazards we face, will more and more press our country into conferences, undertakings, new bilateral and multilateral agreements—all of which have as a common purpose the reduction of unrestrained rivalry in arms, resources, and ideas.

Now, even if this were a lawful world, Mr. Chairman, the dangers would be great. But it is not a lawful world. It is not a world in which nations have a uniform commitment to ethical or legal concepts, and consequently the policymakers in our Nation have no alternative but to rely on the very best knowledge, the most objective analysis, the most careful assessment, the most able ways of understanding intentions, and the most objective estimates.

Just in the field of limiting arms, it is urgent that we know all that we can about our own capabilities and about those of any adversary, and particularly the Soviet Union. We have long ago concluded that mutual inspection is unavailable and therefore obviously hope that it is unnecessary. This will more and more place a particular burden on the intelligence community, since it is the sensor assuring our safety and an intellectual guarantor, at least, of prospects for peace we seek.

I recognize that even as I say this, you, of course, know this at least as well as I do, and that it must have been said before this committee a score of times. And yet I think there are certain fundamental truths, now that these hearings are drawing to a close, that must be reemphasized, perhaps less for the sake of your understanding than for the fact of public understanding of the role and requirement of intelligence.

We do tend, when we talk about intelligence, to look at the more dramatic aspects: The October war, the oil boycott, a massive grain purchase, climactic events in Cyprus, or Angola, or Portugal, or Chile. The fact is, intelligence will be at least as valuable in much less dramatic areas: The sharp analysis of trends—political, social, military and economic; potential developments, such as the formation of new cartels like OPEC; economic assessments, including assessments of the most unlikely events.

Our policymakers need to know what, for example, would be the result if, for several years, the industrial nations of the West suffered unrelenting acute inflation?

How sturdy would the democratic governments be?

How well would our various international organizations function?

Would the European Community remain intact?

Would we see the beginning of trade wars as countries sought to protect their weakening currencies?

We have needed to know how the member nations of OPEC both intended to and actually used the wealth acquired since the fall of 1973. The simple fact is that quadrupling petroleum prices set into motion the largest transfer of wealth in the entire world in all of modern times. The stability of international monetary arrangements depends on the kind of knowledge we look to intelligence to provide. And wise decisionmaking, informed by such intelligence, not only assists the economies of Western industrial nations, but enables us to better know the particular problems of the less developed nations as well.

There is a manner of technology about which we need to have the very best of intelligence. Recommendations are made which must be

1887

decided by particular agencies in the executive branch; that advanced computers be sold to countries which are now not eligible for such purchases; that other forms of high technology be made available. We, of course, wish to enlarge our balance of trade and strengthen the American dollar in the process. We need to know, among other things, whether certain items which are on restricted lists are sold by us to one country, only to be resold to countries which are not eligible. But the much more penetrating questions with which intelligence must deal involve the complicated net assessment of all of the radiating effects which flow from the transfer of high technology from us to someone else.

I would like to look briefly at the means from which this intelligence derives. All of us would, of course, prefer to have this information gathered by and confined to researchers functioning in libraries, statisticians pouring over trade data, political and economic scientists providing their reasoned projections—and let me say I have just described the great bulk of the work which is performed within the intelligence community. Both in numbers of people and dollars spent, this is the giant slice of the intelligence dollar.

In addition, there is information of the most vital kind, not found in libraries, which we must also understand. There are on occasion tactical and collusive arrangements which are part of international trade negotiations. I think there will be more of these, and they will involve the pricing of raw materials which are vital to us. There is the entire difficult business of knowing as much as we can of someone else's intentions, a very difficult business, and yet absolutely essential. There are those within the world's intelligence community who believe that terrorism may well prove to be the most serious of tomorrow's hazards. Mr. Collyer earlier referred to this. It is already among the most brutal and difficult to anticipate among today's dangers. Let me say it has been anticipated in a number of instances. There are hijackings which did not occur, because of knowledge which had been gained by intelligence. I will not go beyond those statements. There is at least one foreign leader—no great friend of the United States, incidentally—who is alive today because we had learned of the details of a plot to assassinate him, and conveyed those details to him in time.

Even with the very best of intelligence, the terrorist finds easier pickings in open societies. If hijackings are commonplace in the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China, they have done a pretty effective job in hiding that knowledge from us and yet I am sure we will all instantly agree we don't want to pay the price of that form of government to secure safety from the terrorist.

In each of the areas to which I have addressed these observations, there is a common thread: Intelligence will be even more the basic instrument enabling us to anticipate danger—military, political, economic; enabling us to know the direction from which the threat may come; and enabling us, if at all possible, to apply unprovocative responses in the hope of avoiding a larger danger.

Intelligence is the means which enables us to reach a widening net of arrangements with some measure of confidence that they will be complied with. There is not the slightest prospect of further arms control measures without the most effective application of the technology and intellect which combine to produce good intelligence. And I will quickly add here, intelligence is not as good as it must be to perform

1889

I do regret, however, that it is in the nature of an investigation, especially one which focuses on inadequacies and misbehavior, that the resulting public understanding will neither be complete nor balanced. You have identified some of the intelligence failures. How I wish it had been possible to illuminate some of the very considerable successes. The very fact that they exist is the strongest reason for keeping their nature and their means quite secret.

Let me just say I have already been pressed here to identify who that leader was of whom I spoke and from which country. I was reminded of these problems just last week in seeing an old movie on television, "Tora, Tora, Tora." In the interest of vital security even a President, Franklin Roosevelt, was for a time taken off the list of those privileged to see the results of the "Ultra Machine" which broke the codes of our enemies. President Roosevelt was allegedly removed simply because he had been careless.

Unfortunately, an investigation like this one does not provide the opportunity for the public to have the sense of the thousands of decent, able, extraordinarily professional analysts, painstakingly applying research and scholarship, doggedly reviewing prominent and obscure facts and data so that the policymaker may have timely analysis, assessment, and recommendations. They are truly an unheralded group of men and women. And incidentally, I do appreciate the fact that ~~I leave in one newspaper, Mr. Pike, a statement from you also warning~~ ~~about a number of these people.~~ They are an unheralded group selected from scores of professional disciplines—economists, historians, psychologists, translators, lawyers, monetary specialists, geographers, doctors, military analysts, biologists, cryptographers, optics and communications specialists, and a host of other fields of scholarship—working toward a common purpose that those who must decide have at their disposal the very best of knowledge and understanding to illuminate their decisions.

Mr. Pike, on Monday night as I watched television news, I heard you say that it is not the Soviet Union which is our greatest danger. If I correctly quote you, you said that the greater danger is that the people no longer believe what their Government tells them. I do agree that we have a serious crisis of belief—of confidence in our institutions. But let me dissent from your observation on two counts. Whatever the failure of our own Government—and those failures include this body as well as the executive branch—those failures are within our capability to control, correct, or change. That, thank our Bicentennial stars, is our good fortune. But whatever danger may lie before us, from the Soviet Union or any other foreign source, cannot be readily corrected by the American people. No ballot box will diminish that danger; no burst of renewed faith among us can altogether deflect that danger—not here, not in Angola, or Portugal, or Central Europe.

I dissent also on other grounds; they are no less serious. There is a crisis of belief in our Government, as you have said, but it is not simply that. We are in the midst of a crisis of all authority—and this is the key point of the nature of the world into which we are increasingly moving. We are in a crisis of all authority, of all our institutions. Those who study public opinion of the American people agree that our regard for all our institutions—medicine, education, religion, military,

1888

all of these functions, and I find no dissent on this proposition within the intelligence community. Incidentally, on arms control, I would like to observe we are talking about that problem at the time when the problem is still relatively manageable. Not many years into the future, we will regrettably be dealing with nuclear capabilities which are widespread and at the possible disposal of some who may be tempted to use that capability to suggest nuclear blackmail.

Chairman PIKE. Mr. Cherne, I think that would be a good point at which to pause. We have a vote on now, rather than a quorum call.

The committee will stand in recess until 11:30.

[Recess.]

Chairman PIKE. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Cherne, please proceed with your statement.

Mr. CHERNE. Mr. Chairman, I was just beginning some comments on the future of subversive warfare, or the more modest activities that are included in the phrase "covert action."

The Soviet Union has already made it clear that it does not interpret the Helsinki agreement as in any way moderating the urgency of its ideological efforts. Indeed, leaders of the Soviet Union have been remarkably candid in observing that they think the tide is running in their favor. There is no monolithic Communist movement, but there are Communist Parties in most countries which are more or less available to advance the interests of one of the centers of Communist power.

I am doing no more than describing the events which occurred in Portugal, which presently exist in Angola, and which hopefully will not threaten a Spain in transition. The Italian Communist Party may be closer to achieving its purposes in Italy today than it was when we were so fearful of that prospect in the late 1940's. Now, shall we eliminate, under any and all circumstances, the ability of the United States and other Western democratic nations to try in some modest degree to apply some counterthrust to this otherwise unrestrained subversion? Are we simply to conclude that the very nations which had hoped that Angola might in fact be independent, must now sit by helplessly as one form of colonialism is replaced by another?

In a public interview within the last month, Gov. Averell Harriman, who is no great fan or recent foreign policies, was quoted as saying that his greatest concerns are not with the fall of one city, but rather with the overthrow of countries and governments worldwide by Russian undercover activities.

I quote specifically: "The Russians are not nuts, they are not crazy people, they're not Hitler. But they are trying to dominate the world by their ideology and we are killing the one instrument which we have to fight that ideology, the CIA."

Incidentally, I happen to disagree with the bleakness of the Governor's assessment. I do not think these investigations will have that effect. Clearly that is not your purpose. Hopefully, instead, this committee will have added to our understanding of what needs to be done to increase the effectiveness of the intelligence product and to promote the more efficient organization of the community so that it may achieve the ends we require.

1891

One final question, Mrs. Melr; do you have problems keeping things secret which must be secret?

Sometimes, but not as in your country. But this is a problem of democracy. If you'll forgive me, it's a misunderstanding of democracy. Because a country is democratic, must everything be known? Must we weaken ourselves and strengthen our enemies? In democracies we think all countries are like ours. Unfortunately, Mr. Chernic, they are not.

Mr. Chairman, I sometimes think we act as though we're a group of honorable men playing poker in a 19th century saloon. There, if someone made an effort to look at another player's cards, he'd run a high risk of getting shot. In the game of nations, if we don't, we run a similar danger.

In 1888, Lord Bryce in "The American Commonwealth" said that America was "sailing a summer sea toward which as by a law of fate the rest of civilized mankind are forced to move." Ambassador Mowbray, in 1976 "The American Commonwealth," recently wrote, "Liberal democracy on the American model tends to the condition of the monarchy in the 19th century: A holdover form of government, one which persists in isolated and peculiar places here and there, and may even serve well enough for special circumstances, but which has simply no relevance to the future. It is where the world was, not where it is going."

Mr. Chairman, both comments, a century apart, are eloquent. I believe they were both, at least in part, wrong. We were neither sailing a summer sea then, nor are we about to fall off the edge now. The world's troubles are great and our problems in dealing with them manifest. This committee is devoting its serious thought to some of those problems. Intelligence cannot help a nation find its soul. It is indispensable, however, to help preserve that nation's safety while it continues looking.

Chairman PIRK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chernic. That was a fine, fine statement.

Admiral Rectanus, would you come to the table now and present your statement?

Admiral Rectanus, we are delighted to have you here. Admiral Rectanus is in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, where he has the title of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Management.

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executive branch, the Supreme Court, the Congress, business, organized labor—our confidence in each of them is at the lowest point since we have measured these attitudes. In fact, not one of those institutions now has the high confidence of a majority of the American people. I suggest, therefore, that when any of us who are leaders in any walk of American life think we can repair our own misfortune by identifying the greater distress of someone else's trouble, we may be deluding ourselves.

We all share the difficulties of what Eric Hoffer calls an "age of disillusionment." A novelist reminded us a number of years ago—it was James Joyce—who said, "History is a nightmare from which we are awoken." It is hard for me to know at this moment: are we in a nightmare or have we just awakened?

While there is still time, I urge we end this orgy of reciprocal abuse, escalating disbelief, and profligate accusations. There are sins enough which we have committed, but it is not for these that we seek expiation so much as for the difficulties and frustrations which simply flow from the fact that we are living in the most complex and dangerous time in the entire history of mankind.

I will conclude, gentlemen, by telling you of a most extraordinary coincidence. I received the invitation to share these thoughts with you on Monday. On Tuesday I was obliged to travel to California. On that plane, sitting directly behind me, was an old, tired, stooped and, to me, surprisingly small woman. I had imagined her to be taller. Because she is a person whose wisdom is widely conceded. I imposed on her. I told her that I would be testifying today and that I knew that the problems in her country were quite different than ours. I thought nevertheless that she might have some observations which would be useful to me, and asked whether I might put four questions to her. I will recall that exchange as exactly as I noted it immediately after I returned to my seat:

Mrs. Melr, each of our countries are democracies. We accept ethical and religious restraints on our behavior. Do we have any right whatever, Mine, Prime Minister, to conduct covert programs in other countries, to meddle in their affairs, seek to change their outcomes?


Mr. Chernic, we forget that other countries are not like ours. They are not governed by the same restraints. They don't hesitate to do the things which democracies worry about. Look now at Angola. Must we all sit by and watch? Mr. Chernic, I attended a Socialist conference in Berlin last February, and we heard then what would happen in Portugal. And we did nothing. And it happened as they said it would. But we remain paralyzed by our own doubts and confusions.

But Mrs. Melr, our Congress understandably feels it must know what is being undertaken. Don't you have the same feelings and pressures in your Parliament, your Knesset?

Frankly, no. We have a Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset, but they do not expect to be told of things that would be better if they did not know. But perhaps we feel a sense of danger which is not felt in your country. Also our representatives, Mr. Chernic, know that we will not use our intelligence abilities for things which are political, which intelligence people should not meddle in.

Mrs. Melr, can you tell me, since our countries each have excellent intelligence services, how did we miss the Yom Kippur war?

Well, I will tell you this: we should not have missed it. I think we had enough information, but there was obstinacy. It was not read properly. And you know your people did the same thing and helped reinforce our refusal to believe what we should have understood. No, I tell you, we should not have missed that one.



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